Volume 120

Issue 1

Article 11

September 2017

Fallout from Obergefell: The Dissolution of Unconventional
Adoptions to Pave the Way for Same-Sex Marriage Equality
Jodi B. Mileto
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Family
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jodi B. Mileto, Fallout from Obergefell: The Dissolution of Unconventional Adoptions to Pave the Way for
Same-Sex Marriage Equality, 120 W. Va. L. Rev. (2017).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/11

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Mileto: Fallout from Obergefell: The Dissolution of Unconventional Adopti

FALLOUT FROM OBERGEFELL: THE DISSOLUTION OF
UNCONVENTIONAL ADOPTIONS TO PAVE THE WAY FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE EQUALITY

I.

INTRODUCTION..........................................

II.

BACKGROUND
..............................
..... 289
A. A History ofDiscriminationin the Gay and Lesbian
Communities
.................................
289
B. Pre-Obergefell. The UnconventionalLegal Relationship .... 293
C. The Adoption Phenomenon
..........................
295
1. General Considerations of Adoption.....
......... 295
2. Adult Adoption Between Same-Sex Couples ................. 297
D. CurrentDissolutionMechanisms
......................... 301
1. Dissolution of Conventional Adoptions ......
....... 302
2. Dissolution of Same-Sex and Other Adult Adoptions .... 303
i. Buchanan
.........................
..... 304
ii. In re Adoption of M..
..............................307
iii. H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W.................
....... 309
iv. In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr........... 310
ANALYSIS
.................................
..... 313
A. Post-Obergefell: A Lingering Cloud over Same-Sex
Marriage.
...................................
314
1. Obergefell's Fallout and Its Unintended
Consequences
.....................
............ 314

III.

2. Time for Change.....................................

286

316

i. Statutory andProceduralVariations ......
..... 317
ii. Distinctive Policy Considerations......
....... 318
B. Paving the Way: A New Uniform DissolutionFramework... 320
1. Statutory Direction
.....................
..... 320
2. Equitable Relief .......................
321
3. Extraordinary Circumstances ...................
322
4. Best Interest Determination ............
.........
323
C. The Uniform DissolutionFramework in Application:
Bosee..............
..................
..... 324
D. Let the Rainbow Flag Fly: Obergefell's Guiding
Principles
.............................
...... 327
E. Where Is the Pot of Gold at the End of This Rainbow? ........ 328
IV.

CONCLUSION

.....................................

........ 330

285

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

286

I.

[Vol. 120

INTRODUCTION

Roland Bosee Jr., 68, and Nino Esposito, 78, are what some may
consider the epitome of the perfect same-sex couple.' The Pennsylvania couple
2
has been together since 1970, almost since the day they met. What some may
3
not know, however, is that while Obergefell v. Hodges legalized same-sex
marriage nationwide in June 2015,4 this loving couple had to fight Pennsylvania
state law for over a year and half just to be able to exercise its newfound right to
marriage.5 Roland and Nino were stuck in a peculiar legal limbo because they
were not able to formalize their relationship through marriage for one distinct
reason: in 2012, Nino adopted his partner Roland, and a person cannot marry his
son. 6
Historically, before same-sex couples were given the right to marry,
many of them were not able to form any type of familial legal relationship under
the laws of their respective states. 7 That being the case, some same-sex couples
8
turned to other legal alternatives to fill that void, including adoption. They did
this for several different reasons including inheritance rights, property rights, and
9
simply to form a binding, meaningful familial relationship with their partner.
Because many states do not allow adoptions to be dissolved, same-sex couples
have experienced several issues with reversing their adoptions so that they can
10
exercise their newfound right to marriage.
This unusual issue recently became highly profiled in the media when
Roland and Nino, the same-sex couple from Pennsylvania who have been
together for nearly 50 years, were denied an annulment of Nino's adoption of

See Chris Potter, Adoption gave gay Fox Chapel couple legal stature; now it disallows them
I
marriage, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 9, 2015, 1:13 PM), http://www.post-

gazette.com/local/north/2015/10/09/Fox-Chapel-gay-couple-had-to-legalize-their-status-throughadoption-now-it-keeps-them-from-getting-married/stories/201510110112.
2

Id.

6

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See generally id.
In re Adoption of R.A.B., Jr., 153 A.3d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
Potter, supra note 1.

7

See id

4

8

Id.
See id.
See id.; see also Chris Potter, Sen. Casey seeks Justice Department guidance on adult
adoptions by gay couples, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 2, 2015, 12:00 AM) [hereinafter
Justice Department Guidance], http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2015/11/02/SenatorCasey-seeks-Justice-Dept-guidance-on-adult-adoptions-by-gay-couples/stories/201511010187.
9
10
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Roland."' Roland and Nino chose to fight for their right and appealed the
Pennsylvania court's decision to deny an annulment of their adoption.12
Unsatisfied with his options under the law at that time, Judge Lawrence J.
O'Toole begrudgingly denied the annulment, while explaining that he
"welcome[d] direction" from the appellate court on this issue.13 Direction did
eventually come, albeit a year and a half later, when Judge Susan P. Gantman of
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded the case. 14
Several other state courts, however, have readily allowed the dissolution
of adoptions like these15 to allow same-sex couples to enjoy their marriage rights
under Obergefell. Even though adult adoption by same-sex couples is not
necessarily a new phenomenon, it is not an issue that has been widely discussed
or legally analyzed. Aptly put, even "though [Roland] is technically an adoptee,
he and [Nino] are in another sense orphans, left behind by marriage laws that have
changed radically, while other laws remain the same. And they aren't alone."l 6
While the Obergefell decision may have made same-sex marriage a
constitutional right,17 it largely left unexplained how states were to enforce that
new right and how they were to overcome any corollary issues resulting from
past legal alternatives to marriage that gave legal stature to same-sex
relationships. One uncommon example of this legal conundrum demonstrates
itself in adult adoption between same-sex couples. 18 Today, many states differ in
their approach to dissolving these unconventional adoptions, if they even allow
it at all. 19 In order to further promote equality under Obergefell, courts need to
apply a unique and uniform dissolution framework to these special adoptions so
that the adoption laws of the states remain stable and so that all couples can have
access to and enjoy the fundamental right to marriage.
Part II of this Note provides the necessary background information
needed to support the implementation of a new, uniform dissolution framework.
Section II.A begins by briefly describing the history of discrimination against
same-sex couples in our society that gives the necessary background information
needed to lead up to the Supreme Court's monumental decision of Obergefell.
Section II.B outlines the legal alternatives that same-sex couples have used in the
past to form binding legal relationships with their partners, leading up to the
alternative that is the focus of this Note-adoption. Section II.C of this Note will

"

See Potter, supra note 1.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

See infra Section II.D.2.iv.
See Potter, supra note 1.

15

17

Id.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015).

18

See Potter, supra note 1.

19

See id.

16
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examine the adoption phenomenon in diverse contexts and discuss normalized
child adoption, before detailing the role of adult adoption in same-sex
relationships. Lastly, Section II.D describes the current legal dissolution
mechanisms and procedures available to terminate adoptions, focusing first on
normalized child adoption and then transitioning to same-sex adoption
dissolution through four specific case studies.
Part III of this Note will use the provided historical background, law,
and policy to argue for a new, uniform dissolution framework for these restrictive
adoptions. Section III.A first argues that these same-sex adoptions are a lingering
impediment to same-sex marriage equality by analyzing Obergefell's failure to
provide a remedy for the inherent issues that arise in the context of same-sex
adoption, and it then argues that the courts must utilize available resources to
develop a new dissolution framework that comports with society's understanding
of same-sex marriage and normalized adoptions.
Section III.B uses the precedent case studies to argue for courts to
implement a flexible, uniform dissolution framework so same-sex couples can
be released from their adoptions and pursue their rights to marriage. This
framework consists of four components that can be used as guidance for future
cases arising from these same issues that could be applicable to West Virginia or
other states that have not yet resolved the issue in any statewide binding
decisions. 20 Section III.C illustrates how this new uniform framework can
streamline the dissolution process by applying it to the Bosee case. Section III.D
briefly analyzes how restricting dissolution of these same-sex adoption cases
hinders reinforcement of Obergefell's guiding principles. Lastly, Section III.E
examines additional implications that have arisen in the Obergefell fallout. The
legal world has expressed concern regarding the precedent set by these
dissolution cases and the different implications for future same-sex couples and
family law in general that may arise in the future.21
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that even with the recent
progress regarding the law and same-sex equality, the history of discrimination
is sure to expose itself for a long time to come in novel and unexpected ways.
Indeed, as our society continues to change and evolve, the law must also be able
to transform in order to keep up with the demands of an equal society.

20
Just because there are no such reported cases in West Virginia does not guarantee that state
courts would not find this matter before them if a same-sex couple were to move to West Virginia
and subsequently seek to annul their adoption and obtain a marriage license.
21
One concern in the area of adoption law is finality. See Potter, supra note 1. In the past,
courts have typically only reversed adoptions for fraud, and changing those laws now for these
specific circumstances could potentially endanger adoption decrees in general. Id. While a full
discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, this Section will also give a nod to other unresolved
legal complications arising from the Obergefell fallout, including other family law issues such as
divorce, parentage, and corollary transgender issues. See infra Section IILE.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/11

4

Mileto: Fallout from Obergefell: The Dissolution of Unconventional Adopti

Falloutfrom Obergefell

2017]

289

II. BACKGROUND

Gay and lesbian individuals in America have always faced
discrimination, and it continues today. Historically, not only have some of those
individuals been forced to adopt their same-sex partner in order to obtain a
limited amount of marriage-like benefits, but some are still tainted by this legally
constricting parent-child relationship even though marriage is now a readily
viable option for them. Without proper guidance for this unusual phenomenon,
states are in a disarray about how to dissolve these unconventional adoptions,
thus keeping these same-sex couples from crossing over that metaphorical-and
literal-threshold. Section II.A begins by discussing the general discrimination
lesbian and gay individuals have faced throughout history until this point in time.
Section II.B then lays out the types of legal alternatives to marriage that samesex couples had to choose from in order to create legally binding relationships
pre-Obergefell. Section II.C describes the general history and principles behind
child adoption and adult adoption, and it also examines the policy considerations
behind both. Lastly, Section II.D examines current state mechanisms and
procedures available for the dissolution of child adoptions and uses four case
studies to illustrate the same when it comes to same-sex adult adoptions.
A. A History ofDiscriminationin the Gay and Lesbian Communities
While the framers of the Constitution referred to basic human rights such
as the freedoms of speech, religion, and association, and the right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishment, they did not explicitly provide the right to be free
of discrimination based on sexual preference. 22 Throughout history, gay and
lesbian individuals have feared and faced what they knew was going to be a
difficult future in American society; their paths were often met with disgust, one
of the fundamental feelings fueling this opposition:
For a long time, our society, like many others, has confronted
same-sex orientations and acts with a politics of disgust, as many
people react to the uncomfortable presence of gays and lesbians
with a deep aversion akin to that inspired by bodily wastes,
slimy insects, and spoiled food-and then cite that very reaction
to justify a range of legal restrictions, from sodomy laws to bans
on same-sex marriage.2 3

Civil Rights The History of Gay Rights,
MINH
T.
NGUYEN,
http://www.enderminh.com/minh/civilrights.aspx#.WE8shWdTHcs (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
23

MARTHA

C. NUSSBAUM,

FROM

DISGUST TO

HUMANITY:

SEXUAL

ORIENTATION

&

22

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW XH-XII (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2010).
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Same-sex practices have been discriminated against religiously,
medically, politically, and legally throughout much of American history.24 In just
a few examples, same-sex practices have caused people to be "beaten in the
streets, fired from their jobs, turned away from emergency medical care, denied
a legal relationship with their own child, [and] refused the chance to say goodbye
to their dying partner of 50 years."2 5 Before the United States Supreme Court
handed down the Lawrence v. Texas 26 decision in 2003, gay couples were still
being prosecuted for their intimate actions taken in the privacy of their own
homes. 27
Even with changing social, political, and legal views, the politics of
disgust have not yet completely disappeared even with the competing, and aptly
named, politics of humanity. 28 The politics of humanity, as Martha Nussbaum 29
describes it, is centered on two factors: respect and sympathy-and both are
essential combatants in the war against discrimination. 30 "The politics of
humanity asks us to stop viewing same-sex marriage as a source of taint or
defilement to traditional marriage but, instead, to understand the human purposes
of those who seek marriage and the similarity of what they seek to that which
straight people seek."3 1

One may wonder then how the politics of disgust can survive in a nation
that grounds itself in the idea that all of its citizens are equal and have a right to
equal protection under the law.32 The gay rights movement gained traction in
1969 and has endured many milestones since then, several of which arose in the

24
See George Chauncey et al., The Historians'CaseAgainst Gay Discrimination,HIST. NEWS
NETWORK (July 2, 2003), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1539.
25
James Esseks, Gay MarriageIs Legal, but We're Still Not Equal, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 9,
2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/09/gay-marriage-is-legal-butwe-re-still-not-equal.html.
26
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
27
See generally id.
28
NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at xv, xix.
29
Martha C. Nussbaum has been characterized as the "philosopher of feelings," and for the
past 30 years, she has been writing about the emotion of disgust aimed at vulnerable populations,
including those who are gay. See Rachel Aviv, The Philosopherof Feelings, NEW YORKER (July
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/25/martha-nussbaums-moral25,
2016),
philosophies. Martha is a professor of law and philosophy at the University of Chicago, where she
has appointments in classics, political science, Southern Asian studies, and the divinity school. Id.
She has published 24 books and over 500 papers and has received 57 honorary degrees. Id.

30

See NuSSBAUM, supra note 23, at xv, xvii.

31
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry? Same-sex Marriageand ConstitutionalLaw, DISSENT
(Summer 2009), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-right-to-marry-same-sex-marriageand-constitutional-law.
32
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at xiv.
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context of same-sex marriage.3 3 While marriage itself has historically been an
ever-evolving battlefield between governments and religions,34 our nation has
continually been "embroiled in a culture war about gay marriage . . [that] has
bled into both the federal legal system and various state legal systems." 35 The
result of this war has been an inconsistent legal patchwork of same-sex marriage
jurisprudence.36 Some have described these patchwork legal conclusions as
being guided by each individual court's moral understanding of discrimination.37
It is these milestones and the dizzying patchwork of legal decisions that
eventually led to the Supreme Court's monumental decision in Obergefell that
ruled in favor of legalizing marriage for same-sex couples in every state
throughout the nation.3 8
In Obergefell, the same-sex marriage issue arose when 14 same-sex
couples and two gay men (whose partners were deceased) filed federal lawsuits
in their respective home states, claiming that the states were violating their
Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying them the right to marry or by refusing
to fully recognize same-sex marriages performed lawfully in another state.39
While looking to the nation's history regarding marriage, the Court noted that
marriage embodies both "continuity and change" and that in contrast to those
beliefs held by those who oppose same-sex marriage, same-sex couples do not
seek to devalue marriage, but they seek marriage because "of their respect-and
need-for its privileges and responsibilities."4 0
In reaching its holding, the Court zeroes in on the history of
discrimination against same-sex couples and extends the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to same-sex marriage. 4 1 The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause was designed to protect fundamental liberties
as they pertain to "personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,

33
See Sewell Chan, Revisiting 1969 and the Start of Gay Liberation,N.Y. TIMES: CITY RooM
(June 8, 2009, 10:47 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/nypl-stonewall-post/

(last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
34

See EvAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE'S

RIGHT TO MARRY 7 (2004). This includes marriage in all contexts and not just marriage as it has
evolved in regards to same-sex couples.
35

Adam Farra, Theories ofDiscrimination& Gay Marriage, 69 MD. L. REv. ENDNOTES 1, 1

(2010).
36
Id.; see also Jeremy W. Peters, Federal Court Speaks, but Couples Still Face State Legal
Patchwork, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/federalcourt-speaks-but-couples-still-face-state-legal-patchwork.html.
3

See Farra,supra note 35, at 1-2.

38

3

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
Id. at 2588.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 2589.
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including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs." 4 2 Importantly,
the Court explains that while history and tradition may guide and discipline a
constitutional inquiry such as this, they do not "set its outer boundaries."4 3
Expanding on that notion, the Court aptly states that "[w]hen new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.""
The Court in Obergefellrelied on four main principles and traditions that
shaped its landmark decision.4 5 First, the Court recognized that "the right to
personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy." 46 Second, it found that marriage is fundamental because it supports
a two-person union that is unparalleled by any other form in regards to its
importance to the individuals involved.4 7 Third, it explained that marriage
safeguards the family when it comes to childrearing and procreation. 4 8 Finally,
it found that marriage is a keystone of the nation's social and legal order.49
Notwithstanding this monumental victory in the LGBTQ50 community,
same-sex couples are still fighting a post-marriage backlash, commonly taking
form in the drafting of new anti-gay bills." While the backlash 52 against
Obergefell may be seen actively in certain contexts such as marriage,53 there is
more uncertainty in regards to how Obergefell interacts with other existing laws,

42

Id.

43

Id.

4

46

Id.
Id.
Id.

47

Id.

45

Id. at 2590.
Id.
50
LGBTQ is the acronym for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer.
s1
See John G. Culhane, The Gay MarriageFightIsn't Over, POLITICO MAG. (June 26, 2015)
[hereinafter Gay Marriage Fight], http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/gaymarriage-legal-backlash- 119468; G.M. Filisko, After Obergefell: How the Supreme Court ruling
on same-sex marriage has affected other areas of law, A.B.A J. (June 2016),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/after-obergefell-howthe-supreme-Court-ruling-o
n samesex-marriagehas-affe/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017); Liam Stack, The Challenges That
Remain for L.G.B.T. People After Marriage Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs (June 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/the-challenges-that-remain-for-lgbt-people-aftermarriage-ruling.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FSameSex%20Marriage%2C%2OCivil%2OUnions%2C%20and%20Domestic%20Partnerships&action=
click&contentCollection-timestopics&region-stream&module=streamunit&version=latest&co
ntentPlacement-45&pgtype-collection&_r-0.
52
See infra Section III.E.
53
See Stack, supra note 51.
48

49
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including divorce, property, child-rearing issues in the family law context,54
transgender issues,55 and even previous legal alternatives utilized by same-sex
couples to substitute for marriage.5 6
B. Pre-Obergefell:The UnconventionalLegal Relationship
Before the revolutionary decision of Obergefell, 37 states legally
endorsed same-sex marriage, and couples in the remaining states were often
forced to utilize alternative legal methods to gain similar advantages that were
easily obtained through heterosexual marriage." These legal advantages to
marriage included "creating legally-recognized family relationships, creating
property and inheritance rights, and creating heirs." 59 Married couples often have
advantages over same-sex couples when it comes to employers, the state, and
other private sector entities. 60 Marriage benefits couples in regards to death,
taxes, healthcare, and housing; 61 marriage even makes separation and divorce
more streamlined by allowing access to legal and financial guidelines. 62 in
addition to these benefits, the word "marriage" itself carries prestige, status, and
other intangible benefits.63

54
Kim Bellware, As Same-Sex Couples Line Up to Wed, Others Celebrate the Right to
Divorce, HUFFPoST (July 1, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/01/gaydivorce-new-orleans n_7707968.html; Filisko, supra note 51; see also Gay MarriageFight, supra
note 51.

5

See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-760, repealed by S.L. 2017-4, § 1 (West 2017); see also

Stack, supra note 51; Richard Wolf, Gay marriagevictory at Supreme Court triggeringbacklash,

USA
TODAY
(May
29,
2016,
4:32
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/29/gay-lesbian-transgender-religiousexemption-supreme-court-north-carolina/84908172/.
56

Elon Green, The Lost History of Gay Adult Adoption, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 19, 2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/19/magazine/the-lost-history-of-gay-adult-adoption.html.
5

Julia Zorthian, These Are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex Marriage,

TuIE (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme-court-states-legal/.
5
See Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and
DisadvantagesofAdult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners,36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75,

75 (1998).
59

Id.

60

M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Value ofMarriagefor Same-Sex Couples, 58 DRAKE L.

REv. 1081, 1084 (2010).
61

WOLFSON, supra note 34, at 13.

62

Id.

63

Alison Leigh Cowan, Gay Couples Say Civil Unions Aren't Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17,

2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/nyregion/17samesex.html.
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Legal alternatives to marriage often included civil unions' and domestic
partnership agreements. 5 As of November 2014, four states allowed for civil
unions, six states and the District of Columbia allowed for domestic partnerships,
and five states had converted civil unions into same-sex marriage. 66 Civil unions
were created to legally provide all of the same state-based rights and
responsibilities of marriage for same-sex couples, while at the same time,
withholding the coveted marriage label. 67 However, same-sex couples have
claimed that these promised rights were not delivered and that inequality will
continue when it comes to civil unions because "separate institutions are
inherently unequal." 6 8 Domestic partnerships, considered the "lowest level of
relationship recognition," 6 9 provided minimal rights for same-sex couples and
those rights varied among jurisdictions, but they "often involve[d] inheritance
rights and next-of-kin status."7 0
Commonly utilized, same-sex couples also had the option of establishing
cohabitation contracts, which were considered a form of partnership
agreement.7 1 Cohabitation contracts and agreements provide coverage when it
comes to property distribution and can even be used to document how children
will be supported, which can include terms beyond any recognized legal
requirements. 72 Unfortunately, these methods were often subject to hostile
claims of undue influence by blood relatives, which were often successful.7 3

6

Id.

65

FREDERICK HERTZ ET AL., NOLO: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 12 (Emily

Doskow ed., 16th ed. 2012).
66
Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnershipstatutes.aspx (last updated Nov. 18, 2014). Civil union states included Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois,
and New Jersey. Id. Domestic partnership states included California, Maine, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Id.
67
John G. Culhane, United States v. Windsor and the Future of Civil Unions and Other
MarriageAlternatives, 59 VLL. L. REv. TOLLE LEGE 27, 29 (2013).
68
Cowan,
supra note
63;
see
also Civil Unions, LGBTQ NATION,
http://www.1gbtqnation.com/tag/civil-unions/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017); Editorial, Separateand
Not Equal, N.Y. TIES (Dec. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/opinion/20sat4.html.
69
Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships: A Comparison, EQUALITY ME.,
(last
http://equalitymaine.org/marriage-civil-unions-and-domestic-partnerships-comparison
visited Sept. 8, 2017).
70
Christina Davis, Domestic Partnerships: What the United States Should Learn from
France'sExperience, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 683, 687 (2006).
71
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 77.
72
Jill Papworth, Why a Cohabitation Agreement Is Essential for Non-Married Couples,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
9,
2013,
2:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/mar/09/cohabitation-agreement-essential-nonmarried-couples.
73
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 76.
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Most notably, these contract-based methods did little in helping same-sex
couples achieve the most desired advantage of marriage: "the creation of a bona
fide family relationship." 74
C. The Adoption Phenomenon
While the alternative legal methods mentioned above "benefit[ed] the
parties in ways that parallel the legal benefits of marriage, none offer[ed] the
benefit of a legal family bond and none carri[ed] inalienable inheritance and
estate rights."7 Adoption, on the other hand, offered both.76 Section II.C.1
discusses the historical and general policy considerations for adoption, focusing
on conventional, normalized adoption-also known as parent-child adoption.
Section II.C.2 examines the history behind adult adoption, the history of adult
adoption between same-sex couples, and it briefly discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of this peculiar alternative to marriage.
1.

General Considerations of Adoption

It is a commonly held belief that children are our "most precious and
valuable assets" because they are essential to our nation's future success. In
American society, "[a]doption touches almost every conceivable aspect" of [our]
culture."7 There is an intimate and direct connection to adoption in our society
because it touches, in some way, the lives of 6 out of every 10 Americans.79
Adoption is a highly profiled phenomenon because, compared to purely
biological family units, it endures additional challenges that are unique to the
legal adoptive process.80 Each state differs in its approach to adoption, even
though most of the 50 states base the ultimate decision on the "best interest of
the child." 81 Historically, there have been numerous reasons why people have

74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.

7
See Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38
NEW ENG. L. REv. 643, 643 (2004) ("Adoption is, first and foremost, about children, their future,
and the future of our civilization. . . ."); Nadia Stewart, Adoption by Same-Sex Couples and the
Use of the Representation Reinforcement Theory to Protect the Rights of the Children, 17 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 347, 349 (2011).
7
E. Wayne Carp, Introduction to THE UNIV. OF MICH. PRESS, ADOPTION IN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2004).

79

Id.

80

Id.
See Jennifer B. Mertus, In re Adoption of R.B.F.: A Step Toward the Recognition and
Acceptance ofNon-TraditionalFamilies, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADvoc. 171, 182 (2003);
Stewart, supra note 77, at 350.
81

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11

[Vol. 120

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

296

shown interest in child adoption: "These reasons range from simply providing an
orphaned or abandoned child with a safe, comfortable, and healthy environment,
to protecting children with special needs or preventing abuse." 82 Additionally,
children have been adopted to provide an heir for the adoptive parents and to
83
carry on the family name for those who do not have biological children.
84
Adoption has also been used by stepparents to adopt their spouse's children.
One societal drive for adoption of children is the view that "every child
deserves to grow up in a permanent, loving family that will give him or her the
85
best chance of becoming a happy, fulfilled and productive adult." Adoption is
meant to benefit everyone involved in the "adoption triad." 86 While it is the hope
that the adopted child and adoptive parent(s) will benefit from the adoption, they
are often not the only parties that benefit. 87 The birthmother and father can also
benefit: "Adoption can bring a positive ending to a problematic situation and can
benefit everyone involved." 88 Adoption is deemed successful when the adoptive
parents gain some sense of closure to the legal process.89 This often means the
finalization of birth certificates and passports. 90 Once the legal process is
91
finalized, the child's "forever family" has been formed. While adoption of a
child to form a parent-child relationship may be an ever-present and normalized
process in our society, there are other types of adoption that are less
conventional---one such example includes adult adoption between same-sex
couples to form a legally binding familial relationship.

82
Brynne E. McCabe, Adult Adoption: The Varying Motives, Potential Consequences, and
Ethical Considerations, 22 QUINN. PROB. L.J. 300, 300 (2009).
83
Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia's Ship ofRevulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence ProtectAdults
Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritancefrom Incest Prosecution?, 32 HAMLINE L.
REv. 95, 99 (2009).

84

Id.

85

Core Values, NAT'L ADOPTION CTR., http://www.adopt.org/core-values (last visited Oct. 5,

2017).

86

Benefits

of

Adoption,

AM.

PREGNANCY.

Ass'N,

http://americanpregnancy.org/adoption/benefits-of-adoption/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). The
adoption triad includes the birthparent(s), the adoptive parent(s), and the child(ren). Id.
87
Id.
Id.
Anthony Watt, We Need to Invest in Adoption, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2011, 6:54 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/joepublic/201 1/sep/30/adoption-system-investment.
9
Id.
88

89

91

Id.
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2. Adult Adoption Between Same-Sex Couples
While there are various reasons for an adult to adopt a child, "the reasons
for adopting an adult [] vary significantly." 92 This type of adoption has
traditionally been used to enable stepparents to adopt the children of their spouse,
even if the children are legally considered adults. 93 Other adult adoptions occur
when the adoptee was raised by the adopter, but the adoptee was not adopted
during childhood. 94 This type of adoption has also occurs when adoptees are
reunited with their birth parents during adulthood." Adult adoptions also take
place for inheritance purposes and permanent caregiving. 96 The availability of
adult adoption varies between jurisdictions, and even though the process for adult
adoption, in essence, mimics that of normalized parent-child adoption, there can
be additional and diverse procedures and requirements depending on the state. 97
However, there is another type of adult adoption, one that carries with it
its own deep-rooted and unique set of rationales-adult adoption between samesex couples.98 Even though this use of adoption has only been quietly
discussed, 99 for almost 40 years, same-sex couples have used adult adoption to
create something highly sought after in the gay community: "a bona fide family
relationship." 100 Apart from forming meaningful legal ties to a spouse, these
adoptions also served to "ensure inheritance and property rights."101 Due to the

McCabe, supra note 82, at 300.
Turnipseed, supra note 83, at 99-100.
94
Id.
9s
Types of Adoptions, NAT'L ADOPTION CTR., http://www.adopt.org/types-adoptions (last
visited Oct. 5, 2017).
96
Id.; see also John G. Culhane, Before Marriage was Possible, Gay People Adopted One
Another. Now Sons Need to Become Husbands., SLATE: OUTWARD (Nov. 10, 2015, 1:22 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/11/10/adult-adoption for-gay-couples can the-adop
tions be undone formarriage.html.
97
Angela Chaput Foy, Adult Adoption and the Elder Population, 8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR
109, 110-11, 14-15 (2006).
9
See generallyPeter N. Fowler, Adult Adoption: A "New" Legal Toolfor Lesbians and Gay
Men,
14
GOLDEN
GATE
U.
L.
REV.
667
(1984),
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1 337&context-ggulrev.
99
Green, supranote 56.
'"
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 75.
92

9

101

Id.
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stigma 102 that underlies this phenomenon in society, the reality is that there is not
03
much, if any, reliable data on the number of such adoptions.1
Because adoption was not addressed by the common law, the legal
procedures for adult adoption in general and the adoption of an adult same-sex
1 04
partner are governed by statute, much the same as normalized child adoption.
Even though all adoptions are governed by statute, adult adoptions are much less
complex, and the procedures for adult adoption differ from child adoption
because the inherent concerns plaguing child adoption are no longer at issue
when the adoptee is an adult.'s Generally, when opposing these types of
adoptions, "courts have based their decisions on grounds such as '(1) nonstatutory public policy; (2) very narrow statutory interpretation; (3) fraud on the
court by attempting to conceal the sexual relationship; and/or (4) incest-related
arguments."' 06 Refusing courts have at times referred to the fact that same-sex
couples are attempting to use the state adoption laws as a legislative work-around
to form "quasi-matrimonial vehicle[s]," which is wholly incompatible with the
legislative intent behind adoption statutes. 107 In contrast, many courts supporting
these adoptions have simply relied on the fact that most of these statutes allow
for the adoption of anyone.'0o

102
Diane Anderson-Minshall, Why Some Couples Must Undo Adoptions to Marry, ADVOC.
2
(Jan. 8, 2016, 7:04 AM), http://www.advocate.com/current-issue/ 016/1/08/why-some-couplesgay adult adoption" and
against
must-undo-adoptions-marry (using the words "strong aversion
discussed in the LGBTQ
openly
been
not
has
phenomenon
the
why
explaining
when
"ick factor"
community).
103
Green, supra note 56.
104
See Fowler, supra note 98, at 689. Almost all states statutorily permit adult adoption.

JOSHUA S. RUBENSTEIN, ESTATE PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX AND UNMARRIED COUPLES AFTER
OBERGEFELL AND WINDSOR: DETRIMENT OR OPPORTUNITY? 16 (2015). For an example of a statute
that specifically allows for the adoption of adults, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101 (West

2017).
1os
McCabe, supra note 82, at 304; see also Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and
Association: Who Should Get What and Why (the Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and
EquitableAdoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 750 (1984)
("The adoption need not change the life-style of either party to the adoption as the obligation of
support and other parental obligations associated with the adoption of a minor do not exist in the
case of adult adoptions.").
106
Jackie Messler, The Inconsistent Inheritance Rights of Adult Adoptees and a Proposalfor
Uniformity, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 1043, 1055 (2012) (quoting Turnipseed, supra note 83, at 111).
107
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424,425 (N.Y. 1984); Dawn Allison,
The Importance of Estate Planning Within the Gay and Lesbian Community, 23 T. MARSHALL L.
REv. 445, 464-65 (1998).
1os
See Fowler, supra note 98, at 689-90; see also Messler, supra note 106, at 1055. For an
example of these type of adoption statutes, see the following: ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.010
(West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7507-1.1 (West 2017); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22801 (West 2017).
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In child adoption, the consent of the biological parents is often a statutory
requisite, whereas in adult adoption, most states do not require consent of the
adult adoptee's biological parents, 10 9 but they usually require the consent of both
adult parties to the adoption."'o This is often the same case when it comes to
agency involvement, such as social service investigations into the home,"' even
though some states may require these reports or at least "give the judge discretion
to order the investigation."' 12 Some states may also require that notice of the
petition for adoption be given to certain interested parties, but this is generally
not the case. 113 Apart from the statutorily derived requirements for an adult
adoption, motive, at times, has also been a concern for courts.'1 4 Petitions for
adoptions would normally not be granted if sought for criminal or fraudulent
purposes." 5 Because of the long history of discrimination against same-sex
marriage, public policy concerns have also made appearances in the deliberations
to grant such petitions.1 16 However, there have been other courts that have
likened these adult adoption petitions to entering into a civil contract, and thus
the need for a significant inquiry into the public policy concerns and relationship
and motives of the parties would be null.'"7 Lastly, some courts have also
ventured into the analysis concerning the "best interests" of the adult adoptee,

109
See Foy, supra note 97, at 117. But see Green, supra note 56 (discussing
the adoption
process for a same-sex couple in New York where consent of the adoptee's biological parent was
required).
110
Fowler, supra note 98, at 692.

I'
112
113

Id. at 693.
Foy, supra note 97, at 117-18.
See Sarah Ratliff, Adult Adoption: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts Under the Uniform

ProbateCode, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1777, 1789 (2011).
114

Russell E. Utter, Jr., The Benefits and Pitfalls ofAdult Adoption in Estate Planningand
Its
Likely Future in Missouri, 80 UMKC L. REv. 255, 258 (2011) (explaining that the value of a
mutually beneficial adoption "becomes murkier when the purpose is due to ulterior motives such
as for beneficiary status or to circumvent the lack of same-sex marriage laws").
115
Fowler, supra note 98, at 693 (citing In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198,
199
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982)); see also McCabe, supra note 82, at 300. Adult adoption for inheritance
purposes has not been blanketed as fraudulent. Ratliff, supra note 113, at 1789.
116
See Fowler, supra note 98, at 690 (finding that "[e]ven when a lesbian or gay couple
has
met the legal requisites for approval of an adult adoption, courts have denied the adoption petition
on the basis that the relationship was not in the best interests of society"); see also Arthur S.
Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Familiesand the Law: A ProgressReport, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927,

949-50 (1994) (explaining that some judges have seen this type of adoption as repugnant to the
relationship between a child and parent in our society); Utter, Jr., supra note 114, at 260 (finding
that some courts have refused to allow homosexual adoption because such an act would be an
aberration of the function of adoption).
117
McCabe, supra note 82, at 306.
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much like they do for child adoptions, even though the factors considered in
making the best interest determination have differed, if considered at all."
Even though adopting a same-sex partner has its advantages, the
disadvantages of and opposition to this phenomenon have caused this alternative
19
to be an unpopular option in the LGBTQ community.' One such disadvantage
of adult adoption is that there is no legal mechanism comparable to divorce if the
12 0
A second
intimate relationship between the same-sex couple ends.
rights
inheritance
adoptee's
of
the
destruction
"the
is
method
this
to
repercussion
12 1
who
couples
same-sex
Additionally,
parents."
natural
her
or
with respect to his
criminal
of
threat
the
face
also
reasons
various
partake in adult adoption for
122
Many same-sex
prosecution by the way of affinity-based incest statutes.
couples are also physiologically and emotionally underprepared for the impact
123
This
of the adoption on the dynamics of an adult intimate relationship.
psychological stressor can also be compounded by negative outside reactions
from family, friends, and co-workers to this perversion of normalized social
roles. 124
Lastly, because of its irrevocability,1 2 5 adult adoption has been
considered "the most drastic of the many legal strategies designed to circumvent
the illegality of same-sex marriage."1 2 6 The irrevocability of this marriage standin may have been one reason why adoption never became the most popular

See id. at 305 (explaining that when determining the best interests of an adult adoptee, courts
have considered the legal and economic purposes sought to be achieved by the parties, while other
courts have declined to extend the inquiry in any form); see also Richard C. Ausness, Planned
Parenthood:Adult Adoption and the Right ofAdoptees to Inherit, 41 ACTEC L.J. 241, 255 (2016)
("[I]n adult adoption cases, many statutes do not require an extensive inquiry into whether a
proposed adoption is in the 'best interests' of the adoptee."). For a contrasting overview of the
factors used in the best interest determination of a normalized child adoption, see Determiningthe
Best Interests of the Child, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY [hereinafter Best Interests],
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best interest.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
119
Mandi Rae Urban, The History of Adult Adoption in California, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 612, 615 (2000).
120
Ratliff, supra note 113, at 1786.
121
Urban, supra note 119, at 615.
122
See id.; see generally Turnipseed, supra note 83 (discussing incestuous prosecution of adult
adoptions in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)); see also Utter, Jr., supra note
114, at 259 (discussing the incestuous overtones that are inherent in same-sex adoption).
123
Madeleine N. Foltz, Needlessly Fighting an Uphill Battle: Extensive Estate Planning
ComplicationsFacedby Gay andLesbian Individuals, IncludingDrasticResort to Adult Adoption
of Same-Sex Partners, Necessitate Revision ofMaryland'sIntestacy Law to Provide Heir-at-Law
Status for Domestic Partners,40 U. BALT. L. REv. 495, 516-17 (2011).
124
Id.
125
See discussion supra pp. 111-15.
126
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 75.
118
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option utilized by same-sex couples to form their legal relationships.1 2 7 In a
progressive society, the irrevocability of these adoptions has provided new
hurdles for same-sex couples since Obergefell gave same-sex couples the legal
right to marry. 128 While some courts have successfully dissolved these adoptions
without controversy, 12 9 other courts have been more reluctant. 13 0 Even judges
known for their progressive attitudes towards same-sex marriage equality have
declined to dissolve these adoptions in order to avoid jeopardizing adoption
decrees generally. 13 1 In order to better understand why courts are unresolved on
the issue, it is necessary to examine the legal mechanisms and authorities used
for reversing these adoptions and the policy concerns behind utilizing them in
diverse contexts.
D. CurrentDissolution Mechanisms

Unlike marriage, where divorce is quite common and streamlined,
"divorcing" an adult adopted child is a much more complex and unresolved
matter. 132 In general, adoptions are irrevocable, 13 3 but reversals have been
honored in unique circumstances. 134 Adoptions that are vacated after finalization
are commonly known as "dissolutions." 135 Dissolution causes the legal
relationship to be severed, either voluntarily or involuntarily.1 36 Section II.D.1
provides the legal mechanisms in place for courts to employ when dissolving
normalized parent-child adoptions and will examine certain circumstances in

Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 98, at 706.
128
C. Brian Smith, A Different Kind of Gay Adoption, MEL (June 14, 2016),
https://melmagazine.com/a-different-kind-of-gay-adoption-87439390721l#.iuxffm5ni;
see also
Ausness, supra note 118 at 244-45 (describing how Obergefell has reduced the need for such
adoptions).
129
See Green, supra note 56.
130
See id. (explaining that couples who have not yet had their adoptions vacated in light of
the
new marriage rights are stranded in kind of limbo and possibly could even face criminal sanctions
by the way of incest statutes); Potter, supra note 1.
131
Potter, supra note 1.
132
Koa Beck, How Marriage Inequality Prompts Gay Partners to Adopt One Another,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/1 1/how-marriageinequality-prompts-gay-partners-to-adopt-one-another/281546/.
133
Elizabeth G. Lutz, It's Me or Your Family: How FloridaDOMA4 and the FloridaProbate
Code Force Same-Sex Couples to Make an Impossible Choice in Estate Planning, 37 NOVA L.
REV. 181, 196-97 (2012).
127

134

Id.

Mirah Riben, Impermanence: When Adoptions Fail, HUFFPosT (last updated Dec. 30, 2014,
3:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mirah-riben/when-adoptions-fail b_6064246.html.
136
The Child Welfare Information Gateway, Adoption Disruption and Dissolution, 31 CHILD.
L.
PRAC.
1,
1
(2012)
[hereinafter
Adoption
Dissolution],
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/s-disrup.pdf.
135
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which these procedures have been properly utilized. Section II.D.2 provides
mechanisms and procedures used for the dissolution of conventional adoptions
to those which are available for the dissolution of adult adoptions, focusing on
case-specific dissolution successes and failures for same-sex couples.
1.

Dissolution of Conventional Adoptions

Every child, regardless of how or why the child has entered the adoption
world, "has one thing in common - a need for a stable and loving environment
with a parent or parents that are dedicated to educating themselves to give their
13 7
children what they need for a successful life." It is because of this need for13 a
stable and safe environment that dissolution can be detrimental to the child. 1
When adoptions fail, children commonly experience grief, depression, and
anger-often causing the child to feel the need to lash out in order to gain
1 39
Dissolutions can often be an
attention during the tumultuous transition.
14 0
excruciating last resort and can also be damaging to the other parties involved.
Accurate data relating to the dissolution of child adoptions are often
14 1
difficult to obtain because of the private and sealed nature of adoption records.
Dissolution of these adoptions is also relatively uncommon-studies consistently
142
report that dissolutions occur in approximately 1% to 10% of cases. While
143
there may be numerous reasons why adoptions of children dissolve, studies
have shown that dissolutions have a positive correlation with the increasing age
of the child.1 44 When it comes to children with special needs, adoptive parents
have sought dissolutions due to a lack of information regarding services, coupled
with their cost.145 Of course, there are other reasons children might not actually
Salendria Mabrey, When a Forever Home Isn't Forever: The Reality of Adoption
Dissolution, FOSTER CARE NEWSL. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://foster-care-newsletter.com/foreverhome-isnt-forever-reality-adoption-dissolution/#.WFLkbVMrLs.
138
See Joanna E. Jordan, There's No Place Like Home: OverhaulingAdoption Procedure to
ProtectAdoptive Children, 18 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 237, 240 (2015).
139
Id. at 241-42.
140
See Jon Bergeron & Robin Pennington, Supporting Children and Families When
2013),
(Aug.
8-10
ADOPTION
FOR
COUNCIL
NAT.
Occurs,
Dissolution
62
.pdf
https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/images/stories/NCFAADOPTIONADVOCATENO
141
Riben, supra note 135.
142
Bergeron & Pennington, supra note 140.
143
For an overview of the commonalities found in adoption dissolutions, see Bergeron
Pennington, supra note 140, at 2-4; see also Diane Mapes, It Takes More Than Love: What
AM),
6:14
2012,
1,
(Aug.
TODAY
Fails,
Adoption
When
Happens
&

137

http://www.today.com/parents/it-takes-more-love-what-happens-when-adoption-fails-918076.

Krysten E. Beech, The Perfect Storm: When FailingAdoptions Collide with an Ineffective
144
Legal System, Re-Homing Emerges as a Viable Option for Adoptive Parents- Suggestions for
Fixing a Broken System, 46 TOL. L. REv. 449, 451 (2015).
145
Id. at 452.
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remain with their supposed "forever family."1 46 The internet is riddled with
horror stories of adoptions gone wrong-stories that paint a harrowing scene of
dangerous and uncontrollable children. 147 Reasons for seeking dissolution aside,
the question then becomes, is dissolution available? And if so, will the petition
for dissolution be granted?
The dissolution process can take different forms "depending on the laws
of each state,148 as well as the involvement or lack of involvement of an adoption
agency or the state social welfare system." 1 4 9 To dissolve an adoption, courts
have considered the best interest of the child and the ability of the adoptive
parents to adequately care for the child.`0 Other courts have readily dissolved
adoptions in cases where the adoptive parents have presented contractual
defenses, including mistake, lack of informed consent, or fraud in obtaining
consent.151 On the other side of the spectrum, courts have been known to refuse
to dissolve an adoption absent exceptional circumstances. 152 Because the
statutory requirements for adult adoptions often differ from child adoptions,1 53
adult adoption dissolution procedures and the accompanying policy concerns
will be discussed comparatively in the following Section.
2. Dissolution of Same-Sex and Other Adult Adoptions
One of the main considerations of adult adoption--especially partner
adoption-is the permanence of the arrangement. 154 In the event that a same-sex
couple would want to separate socially or intimately, the legal bond as parent
and child would remain because there is no universal dissolution mechanism that

146
Dawn Friedman, The Myth of the Forever Family: When Adoption Falls Apart, BRAIN,
CHILD (Nov. 3, 2013), https://www.brainchildmag.com/2013/1 1/the-myth-of-the-forever-familywhen-adoption-falls-apart/.
147
See id.; see also Riben, supra note 135.
148
While the specific and individual laws of each state are beyond the scope of this Note, this
Section will examine the different factors that courts often use in analyzing dissolution petitions.
149
Bergeron & Pennington, supra note 140, at 4. To illustrate the diverse types of adoption
statutes and their detail, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-214 (West 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 9-315 (2017); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-704 (West 2017).
150
Riben, supra note 135.
151
See In re Flangel, 409 N.E.2d 521, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding that the adoptive father
was allowed to move to vacate the decree of adoption where his wife had fraudulently induced him
to adopt the child); Lane v. Pippin, 158 S.E. 673, 673 (W. Va. 1931) (finding that adoptions should
not be disturbed absent fraud or showing that the child's best interests would be served by the
reversal); Beech, supra note 144, at 452.
152
See generally In re Adoption of M., 722 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (allowing
an adopted daughter to dissolve the adoption as to her recently divorced adoptive father so that the
pair could marry and legitimize the child born to them); Beech, supra note 144, at 453.
153
See supra Section II.C.2.
154
Messler, supra note 106, at 1058.
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parallels divorce in these circumstances."' Similar to child adoption
dissolutions, these adoptions will not be vacated "except in very narrow
circumstances, or unless the statute provides for it." `6 The division among courts
to dissolve these adoptions is illustrated by the four case studies below, which
will demonstrate in detail the various dissolution mechanisms and their successes
and failures in the context of this unique adoption phenomenon.
i.

Buchanan157

At the time Donald Ray Buchanan and Thomas Ainora brought their
petition for termination of parental rights, they had been in a romantic
relationship for over 30 years. 58 In 2002, while residing in Maryland, Mr. Ainora
adopted Mr. Buchanan. 15 9 The two entered into the adoption because, at that
time, they were not legally allowed to marry. 16 0 The couple wanted to legalize
their relationship for several reasons, including next-of-kin rights, inheritance
rights, and, in general, the ability to take care of one another as they grew in
age. 161 In 2013, the couple took up residence in the District of Columbia, and at
the time the petition was brought, same-sex marriage was legal. 162 On February
19, 2016, both petitioners testified in family court as to their consent to the
petition and their desire to dissolve the adoption so that they could become
legally married. 163
In its analysis, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia began with
its equitable powers to grant such a petition. 16 The court recognized its authority
to grant the petition under its "inherent equitable powers to do that which justice
requires and which is not barred by statute."165 It found that this authority
bestowed the power "to give such relief as it finds is required under the
circumstances."'66 It next turned to the issue of whether the legislature had

155
See Alma G. Lopez, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the
HeterosexualRight to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 347, 357 (1993); see also Lisa R. Zimmer,
Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 681, 691 (1990).
156
Fowler, supra note 98, at 706.
157
Buchanan v. Ainora, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2016).
15s
Id. at * 1.
159
Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

163

Id.
Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. (emphasis added).
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limited the court's authority in this circumstance and found that it had not: Even
though the District of Columbia Code did outline certain restrictions in regards
to terminating parental rights, the court found that the pertinent sections did not
apply because their purpose was to deal with minor children.167 Thus, the unique
situation presented in the case before them had not been contemplated by the
legislature and was deemed unrelated and unrestricted.168 The court then focused
on the petitioners' consent to the termination and found that no constitutional
rights were being infringed upon. 169
In the alternative, the court went so far as to say that even if it had been
constrained by the legislature, the petition would still be granted because the
dissolution was in Mr. Buchanan's best interest. 170 Just as in child adoption cases,
the court found that it had wide latitude in the best interest determination. 17 1 In
its determination, the court looked to the statutory factors listed under the
pertinent code section1 72 and considered additional factors relevant to the parties'
individual circumstances:

167
168
169

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.

170

Id. at *3.
Id.
172
D.C. CODE § 16-2353 (2017). The statute lists the "[g]rounds for termination of parent and
child relationship":
(a) A judge may enter an order for the termination of the parent and child
relationship when the judge finds from the evidence presented, after giving due
consideration to the interests of all parties, that the termination is in the best
interests of the child.
(b) In determining whether it is in the child's best interests that the parent and
child relationship be terminated, a judge shall consider each of the following
factors:
(1) the child's need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely
integration into a stable and permanent home, taking into account the
differences in the development and the concept of time of children of different
ages;
(2) the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the
degree that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration
being the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child;
(3) the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or
her parent, siblings, relative, and/or caretakers, including the foster parent;
(3A) the child was left by his or her parent, guardian, or custodian in a hospital
located in the District of Columbia for at least 10 calendar days following the
birth of the child, despite a medical determination that the child was ready for
discharge from the hospital, and the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child
has not taken any action or made any effort to maintain a parental,
guardianship, or custodial relationship or contact with the child;
(4) to the extent feasible, the child's opinion of his or her own best interests in
the matter; and
(5) evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist in a child's home
environment after intervention and services have been provided pursuant to
171
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Mr. Buchanan has no need for continuity of care or caretakers,
nor does he require "placement" as he is an independent adult
who has been taking care of himself for decades, and
terminating Mr. Ainora's parental rights will have no impact on
whether or not Mr. Buchanan is "cared for" in this manner ....
Mr. Buchanan's physical, mental, and emotional health will
only be enriched upon termination, as he will finally be able to
marry his partner of over three decades and receive the societal
and personal recognition and protection associated with
such .... Mr. Buchanan's relationship with Mr. Ainora will
only be strengthened if they are allowed to marry, and the
romantic and loving nature of their relationship will finally be
accurately reflected in their legal statuses. Finally . .
Mr. Buchanan's opinion as to his own best interests have been
clearly stated through his filing of this Consent Petition, and he
wishes for Mr. Ainora's parental rights to be terminated."'
In addition to the factors listed above, the court took into consideration
other legal and personal factors, including that as father and son, the pair has
been able to enjoy only a very limited amount of legal protections and has been
barred from the "plethora of legal, financial, and personal benefits of
marriage." 1 74 The court went on to focus on the quality of the parties'
relationship, finding that it had always been that of equal partners in a romantic
and supportive relationship and that they had never considered themselves to be
father and son.' 7 5 By granting the petition for termination, the court reasoned that
their relationship could "only be strengthened, nurtured, and dignified" as they
would finally have the freedom to marry. 176
Lastly, the court analyzed the petition in light of public policy and found
that the dissolution was in accordance with such policy.' 77 The court referenced

a similar situation, where an adoption was dissolved for another same-sex couple

section 106(a) of the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977,
effective September 23, 1977 (D.C. Law 2-22; § 4-1301.06(a)). Evidence of
continued drug-activity shall be given great weight.
Id.
173
174

'
176
177

Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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in 2010.178 Most notably, the court's support of the petition rested on the fact that
the legislature already treated adult adoptions differently from adoptions of
minor children, insomuch as the legislature had demonstrated that the District of
Columbia did "not recognize any real 'parental rights' over legal adults to begin
with."1 7 9 In holding, the court granted the petition for dissolution." 0
ii.

In re Adoption of M.' 8 1

While this case does not involve the adoption between a same-sex couple
in the exact context that has been discussed throughout this Note, the Superior
Court of New Jersey's dissolution of an adoption between a father and daughter
holds significance because the facts are essentially analogous to same-sex
adoption cases-the petitioner daughter in this case also sought dissolution as an
adult so that she could later form a legal relationship with her adoptive father by
marrying him. 18 2 In this New Jersey case, the petitioner daughter was adopted in
1991 at the age of 15.183 The petitioner, at 22 years old, moved to vacate a final
judgment of adoption as to her then recently divorced adoptive parents 84 so that
she could marry her adoptive father and legitimize the child conceived by them,
without being criminalized for incest.18 Ultimately, the court decided to vacate

the adoption for factual and legal reasons and for the sake of the newborn
infant.'1

6

In its analysis, the court recognized that the relationship between the
petitioner and her adoptive father had transgressed the parameters of a parentchild relationship well before the act of conception. 87 Under New Jersey law at
the time the petition was sought, an adoption could not be challenged if more
than a year had passed since its finalization, and if under a year, it could only be
challenged in the instance of "(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect, (b) newly discovered evidence [or] (c) fraud, misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party." 88 Further, the court explained that a judgment

17

Id.; see also Ellen McCarthy, Wow, What a Long Engagement That Was!, WASH. POST (June

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp2010),
27,
dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062406743.html?sid%3DST2010062502300&sub-AR.
179
Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *4.
1
Id.
181
722 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 617.
184
Id. at 616-17.
185
See id. at 617.
186

Id.

187

Id. at 618.

188

Id. at 619.
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of adoption, like any other judgment or order, "can be amended, modified or
vacated in the interest of justice."l89 Even though the court respectfully
recognized the legislature's desire for finality in judgments of adoptions, it could
not ignore that a vacation of a judgment should be granted when confronted with
"truly exceptional circumstances"founded on the particular facts of each case. 190
It then stated that the boundaries of this "exceptional circumstances" standard
"are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice."1 91
Next, the court turned to the guiding public policy considerations
underlying revocation, once again relying on the exceptional circumstances
determination. 192 Subsequently, the court noted that ordinarily, the ultimate
consideration remained in the best interests1 9 3 of the adoptive childl 94 and the
adoptive parents. 195 Additionally, the court referenced "the inherent equitable
authority of a court of chancery." 196 Because family courts are courts of equity,
the court explained that "[e]quity involves the obedience to dictates of morality
and conscience. The morality of which equity speaks is that of society and not
the judge's personal view of right and wrong. Likewise, equity may not disregard
statutory law but looks to its intent rather than its form."197
The court then referred to the specific language of the relevant New
Jersey statute,198 which commanded that "due regard shall be given to the rights
of all persons affected by an adoption." 1 99 Using this language, coupled with
such other language regarding the best interests of the child, the court found that
the legislature implicitly recognized the breadth of consequences that finality can
have on adoptions, especially when it comes to the consequences of the passage
of time and the change of circumstances, and how those changes can, in unique
situations, adversely affect all persons involved in the adoption.200 Consequently,
the court found that based on the truly exceptional circumstances of this case, the
interests of all those involved in the adoption had changed measurably. 2 0 1

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
191
Id. at 620 (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 639 A.2d 286, 286 (N.J.
1994) (citation omitted)).
192
Id. at 619.
193
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West 2017).
194
In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 619.
189
190

195
196
197

Id. at 620.
Id.
Id. (quoting Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990)).

198

See N.J.

199

In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 620 (emphasis added).
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621.

200
201

STAT. ANN.

§ 9:3-37 (West 2017).
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Unlike any other prior reported opinions, the court found that this case
warranted different treatment for three noteworthy reasons.202 First, unlike prior
reported cases, the petitioner was an adult, and thus moved to vacate her adoption
post-emancipation, causing the best interest standard to be moot. 20 3 Second, the
purpose of the petition was to remove a legal impediment to marriage, one they
would not have faced but for the adoption. 2 04 While the court found that the
advantages to the petitioner and the adoptive father warranted consideration, the
court did not necessarily focus on their best interests in coming to its decision.205
Instead, it did focus on the best interests of the newborn child-which could only
be effectuated through dissolution of the adoption.206 Third, the court found that
vacating the adoption under these circumstances would have provided the
petitioner no less relief than would have been available to her had she
alternatively proceeded under New Jersey law in moving to terminate her
adoptive relationship with her father in favor of adoption by another adult. 20 7
ii.

H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W. 2 0 8

On May 23, 1995, H.M.A. petitioned to adopt C.A.H.W., her long-time
companion, for financial purposes and to formalize their intimate relationship.2 09
H.M.A.'s petition for adoption was granted on July 17, 1995, and as of 2013, the
parties had been together for 33 years. 2 10 H.M.A. sought to dissolve the adoption
so that couple could enter into a civil union, which was statutorily unavailable at
the time of the adoption. 2 11 H.M.A. argued that a civil union offered greater
protection for the parties and that it was "a more appropriate way to recognize
the strong emotional bond between the parties." 2 12
Although the Family Court of Delaware recognized the procedural bars
to challenging the adoption decree, it declared that it had the authority to reopen
and vacate adoptions in specific and limited circumstances.2 13 H.M.A. sought
relief pursuant to a family court civil rule, arguing that the current arrangement
was no longer equitable and the interests of justice required that the court grant

202

Id. at 622.

203

Id.

204

Id.
Id.
Id.

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 622-23.
No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 28, 2013).
Id. at *1.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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the relief sought.214 The pertinent rule stated that dissolution may be granted for
the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. 2 15
2 16
Under subsection (6), the petitioner must show "extraordinary circumstances."
Taking into account the change in Delaware law allowing civil unions, the court
granted the petition, finding that the case exhibited extraordinary circumstances.
The court went on to conclude that it was no longer equitable for the adoption
decree to have prospective application because the new civil union statute
"provid[ed] for greater rights, responsibilities and protections for the parties than
2 17
the 1995 adoption afforded."

iv.

In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr.2 18

Roland Bosee, Jr., and Nino Esposito met on Easter Sunday in 1970219
and have been in a relationship for over 40 years. 2 20 Nino, 10 years older than
Roland, adopted Roland in 2012, before same-sex marriage was legal.221 At that
point in their lives-Nino at age 78 and Roland at 68-they never believed that
they would legally be allowed to marry.222 They sought adoption for financial
reasons and to form a legally valid familial relationship.22 3 However, once samesex marriage became legal, the couple petitioned a Pennsylvania court to dissolve

214
215

216
217

Id.
Id. (quoting DEL. FAM. CT. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
Id. at *2.
Id.

221

In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038 (Ct. Corn. Pl. July 21, 2015).
Potter, supra note 1.
In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038.
Potter, supra note 1.

222

Id.

223

Id.

218
219
220
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the adoption.224 After a hearing and oral argument on the issue, the petition was
denied on June 11, 2015.225 The court, in denying the petition, stated that
Pennsylvania law did not give the authority to annul an adoption.2 26 In reviewing
previous cases allowing for revocation, the court found that those cases revolved
around the issue of fraud and the failure to give proper notice to the interested
parties. 227 Although the court explained that it was "sensitive to the situation in
which Nino and Roland found themselves in 2012," it subsequently stated that
vacating the adoption "would place in jeopardy and imperil adoption decrees
generally." 2 28 Subsequently, the couple appealed the decision. 2 2 9 Even with his
denial of the petition, Judge O'Toole explained that he would "welcome[]
direction from ... appellate courts in handling [future] parallel cases." 230 Over a
year and a half later, Judge O'Toole did indeed receive direction from Judge
Gantman of the Pennsylvania Superior Court on how to dissolve not only the
Bosee case, but also future adult same-sex adoption cases in general.23 1
In the unopposed appeal, Nino contended that adoption laws could not
be used to bar the annulment of their adoption in favor of their marriage. Nino
also argued that the denial "'is [no] different from the unconstitutional effect of
the . . laws that were struck down.' It also contends that the ruling ignored
precedents establishing that 'the welfare of the child [Roland] is of paramount
importance, even in proceedings to vacate an adoption decree."' 2 3 2 I other
words, Nino alternatively raised the issue of Judge O'Toole's failure to consider
the best interests of the adoptee, Roland.233 Nino explained in the appeal that it
was in Roland's best interest to annul the adoption because the couple loved each
other and wished to marry-something they could not previously legally do.234
The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed.235 In its analysis, the court explained
that the Orphans' Court236 is a court of equity, and as such, it applies the

224

Id.

225

In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038.

226

Id.

227

Id.; see, e.g., In re M.J.S., 903 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); In re Adoption
of R.J.S.,

889 A.2d 92, 99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
228

In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038.

229

Potter, supra note 1.
In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038.

230

231
232
233

In re Adoption ofR.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
Potter, supra note 1.
In re Adoption ofR.A.B., 153 A.3d. at 334.

234

Id.
Id. at 336.
236
In Pennsylvania, the Orphans' Court has the jurisdiction to hear adoption matters and is the
court in which the original dissolution petition was sought. See id at 335.
235
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principles and rules of equity.237 In reiterating that Pennsylvania does not have a
specific statute relating to the revocation of adoption decrees, it stated that "even
in the absence of specific statutes in some jurisdictions, courts granting decrees
of adoption do have jurisdiction to revoke those decrees for good cause, the
proceeding being equitable in nature and the welfare of the child being a most
important phase of the consideration by the court." 23 8 However, it warned that
"[w]hen the rights of a party are clearly defined [by the rules of law], equity
should not change or unsettle those rights."2 39
Judge Gantman declared that same-sex marriage had been made legal in
Pennsylvania in 2014240 and further cited to Obergefell by specifically honing in
on the fact that the fundamental nature of marriage is emphasized by the way the
nation places marriage "at the center of so many facets of the legal and social
order." 241 Furthermore, in support of allowing adults in adoptive relationships to
dissolve their adoptions in order to marry, the court cited not only H.M.A. v.
C.A.H. W, but in In re Adoption ofM. as well.2 4 2 While recognizing that Roland's
and Nino's 2012 adoption was the only way to formalize their relationship and
obtain the legal rights that they desired, Judge Gantman made clear that the
Orphans' Court frustrated the couple's ability to marry in the wake of their new
rights to same-sex marriage.2 43 In holding, the court found that Pennsylvania law
permitted an unopposed revocation of adult adoption under the "wholly new and
unique circumstances" of the case and that the Orphans' Court had the authority
to grant such relief, even though the right to dissolution was not expressly
provided for by any statute. 24 In conclusion, Judge Gantman stated that the
Orphans' Court erred when it held that it lacked power to dissolve the adoption
and thus reversed and remanded the case for entry of an order granting the
dissolution.245
The pre-Obergefellworld offered several legal alternatives for same-sex
couples seeking at least some of the same rights that were automatically
bestowed upon heterosexual married couples; all of them fell short, however, in
not only providing a bona fide familial relationship, but also the privileges that
come along with it. 24 6 Adult adoption, while seemingly irrevocable, offered what

Id. at 334.
Id. at 335 (quoting Adoption of Phillips, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 387, 396-97 (Somerset Cty.
1957)).
239
Id.
240
See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
241
In re Adoption ofR.A.B., 153 A.3d at 336.
237
238

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

245

Id.
Id.

246

See supra Section II.B.
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some same-sex couples saw as the next best solution in a discriminatory legal
system. 247 Nevertheless, this phenomenon has been rendered irrelevant
nationwide by Obergefell, which declared that same-sex couples have a
fundamental right to marriage in every state.248 With this newfound right to
marriage, same-sex couples who previously turned to adult adoption are now
seeking dissolution of their adoptions in the pursuit of equality. 249 The variance
in state law regarding revocation of adoption decrees has created a disadvantage
for some same-sex couples, delaying their ability to exercise their new rights and
frustrating the principles of equality under Obergefell.250 In order to remedy the
historical discrimination relating to same-sex marriage and to promote equality
as demanded under Obergefell, courts need a more efficient and uniform
framework to process dissolution cases when it comes to same-sex adult
adoption.
III. ANALYSIS
The above case studies illustrate a small portion of same-sex adoption
dissolution cases; there will certainly be more dissolution cases to follow. Roland
and Nino are certainly.not the only same-sex couple that has suffered or that will
suffer in the face of an unresolved area of adoption law. Because states may vary
in their approach to dissolving these unconventional adoptions, a unique and
uniform dissolution framework needs to be applied to these special adoptions so
that the adoption laws of the states remain stable and so that all couples can have
access to, and enjoy, the fundamental right to marriage given to them under
Obergefell.
Section III.A argues for recognition of Obergefell's timely-yet
untimely-fallout and explains why it is time for courts to change their current
approach to adoption dissolution law. Section III.B gives recommendations for
a new dissolution framework that divided courts can use in analyzing upcoming
dissolution cases in this context. Section III.C utilizes the Bosee case to
demonstrate how the uniform dissolution framework can be applied to future
real-world adoption dissolution cases. Section III.D examines how unsuccessful
dissolution of these adoptions will undermine Obergefell's guiding principles
regarding marriage equality. Section III.E explores the future implications that
these dissolutions will have in the family law context and briefly analyzes other
unresolved challenges in the LGBTQ community that have arisen in the wake of
Obergefell.

247
248
249
250

See supra Section II.C.2.
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See supra Section II.D.2.
See Green, supra note 56.
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Post-Obergefell:A LingeringCloud over Same-Sex Marriage

In light of the post-Obergefell era, Section III.A. 1 analyzes the way in
Supreme Court's decision has created a solution to one problem while
the
which
creating another unforeseen issue in family law. The unfortunate reality is that
the landmark decision has left some same-sex couples in a legal limbo as they
25 1
Section III.A.2 argues for a
attempt to enforce their new rights to marriage.
change in adoption dissolution procedure, focusing on the inherent differences
between the child and adult adoption process and varying policy considerations.
1.

Obergefell's Fallout and Its Unintended Consequences

Upwards of 20 years ago, the projections for same-sex adoption were
and unfathomable.25 2 While some conceded that there was no
negative
largely
"immediate substantial harm" from the practice, this unconventional relationship
has been considered to be little more than a black cloud lingering over the "the
253
reputation of the institution of adoption, as the defender of children's rights."
Regardless of the potential criticism from outsiders, these adult adoptions did
take place for numerous reasonS 254 and often happened in response to the varying
state laws in regards to same-sex marriage and other legal alternatives to
25
marriage, such as domestic partnerships and civil unions. 1 While same-sex
marriage was a remote proposition when adult adoption became a recognized
25 6
even optimistic couples realized that even
option in the LGBTQ community,
state, there would be a slow process of
their
in
option
an
if marriage became
25 7
credit among [the different] states."
and
resolving issues "involving full faith
Although Obergefell has given the same-sex community the legal right to marry
in every state,258 the black cloud of same-sex partner adoption not only lingers
over the institution of adoption, but also over the newfound right to the institution
of marriage for same-sex couples.
For couples in states that did not recognize same-sex marriage, the need
for adult adoption existed up until Obergefell was decided in 2015.259 One would
think that because this practice is no longer needed, it should not be an issue for
same-sex couples any longer-but Roland and Nino have shown that this

251

Id.

252

See Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 93.

253

Id.

254
255

See supra Section II.C.2.
See supra Sections I.B, II.C.2.

256

Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 94.

257

Id.

258

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

259

Green, supra note 56; see also Ausness, supra note 118, at 244.
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assumption is sorely misplaced. There are same-sex couples today who are now
suffering from the consequences of their earlier decisions to seek what was once
thought of as an irrevocable legal alternative to marriage. Same-sex couples have
not only used adult adoptions, but they have also used civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and contracts-all which have failed as adequate and parallel legal
alternatives to marriage. 2 60 Even though adoption, as a "pseudo-marriage," may
have had more advantages than some of the other legal alternatives available at
the time, 2 6 1 it still leaves same-sex couples with all of the inherent disadvantages
of adoption and without all of the advantages of marriage that should-and
would-be available to them if the dissolution process were streamlined and
applied uniformly across the states.
By being trapped in their adoptions, these same-sex couples are without
a comparable divorce mechanism if their intimate relationship ends-they
forever legally remain as parent and child and are without the aid of the courts in
their separation. 262 Moreover, if these couples do try to marry without
successfully annulling their adoptions, they may find themselves back in the days
before Lawrence v. Texas, where they may be criminally prosecuted for their
intimate relations and private activities if their states have affinity-based incest
26
statutes.263
Furthermore, without a viable dissolution mechanism, many of these
couples will be forced to live with the emotional, psychological, and social
baggage that accompanies their unconventional legal parent-child relationship
status.264 Adoption may have given them one type of legal familial relationship,
but it has not provided them with the true title they seek and have always desired.
There is no doubt that today, given their new rights, same-sex couples
would probably never even consider adult adoption as the best way to form their
special family bonds or obtain any other advantageous legal rights.265 And while
many gay and lesbian couples may have previously considered the disadvantages
of adult adoption to outweigh its advantages, deciding to forego this
unconventional legal alternative,2 66 there are some who did not. For the ones who
decided that adult adoption was not in their best interest for personal or legal
reasons, their dreams of marriage can now become a reality. But for those other
same-sex couples who had no other option but to make that difficult choice and
who decided to utilize adult adoption for all that it could offer them, many are
still plagued by the disadvantages of that legal alternative and the restriction that

260

261

Lopez, supra note 155, at 361.
See supra Sections IB, II.C.2.

262

See Zimmer, supra note 155, at 691.

263

See Urban, supra note 119, at 615.

264

Foltz, supra note 123, at 516-17.

265

See Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 94.
See supra Section II.C.2.
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2 67
it now imposes on them in the midst of their newfound rights. With all of its
merits, Obergefell failed to give direction to states on how to enforce these new
rights and how they are to overcome any corollary issues resulting from past
26 8
same-sex adoptions, specifically, their timely and efficient dissolution.
"How to dissolve adult adoptions by gay couples 'is a question
throughout the country."' 2 69 Because of the states' lack of conformity in legal
dissolution mechanisms and their application, many of these couples-like
Roland and Nin-may still be suspended in legal limbo, trapped in their
adoptive relationship and consequently being denied the privilege to fully enjoy
the advantages that legal marriage could offer them.270 Even though Roland and
his partner Nino fought and won their battle to enjoy same-sex marriage, the
history of discrimination still has a hold on adopted same-sex couples across the
nation who could be the next Roland and Nino.
Even with the authoritative voice of Obergefell ringing in their ears, the
27 1
power to dissolve these adoptions ultimately rests in the hands ofjudgeS -and
what a mighty power that is to two people who have possibly waited almost a
lifetime to marry the person they love. Attorneys who practice LGBTQ family
law and others who support same-sex equality hold high hopes that these judges
will "embrace the opportunity to bring justice . .. and use their equitable powers
to right past wrongs." 27 2 With Obergefell now in their legal toolbox, it is time for
judges all over the nation to change the way that they view adult adoption
dissolution mechanisms and procedures for same-sex couples. The only way to
continue moving forward in same-sex equality is to identify these historical and
discriminatory legal restrictions and to develop new tools to work around them.
Because the adoption of children and the adoption of adults involve different
motives and policy considerations,27 3 they should receive different treatment in
same-sex adoptions as well. In order to further promote same-sex marriage
equality under Obergefell, courts should adopt a new, uniform dissolution
framework that accurately reflects and takes into considerations these variables.

2. Time for Change
Given the historical lack of equality for same-sex couples, finality may
have been a major concern for those same-sex couples seeking adoption as a legal

267
268
269

See Potter, supra note 1.
Justice DepartmentGuidance, supra note 10.

270

Id.
See supra Section II.C.2.

271

Green, supranote 56.

272

Id.
See supra Section II.C.2.
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alternative to marriage,2 74 but times have changed since then. With Obergefell, our
evolving society has provided increasing rights for same-sex couples and
eliminated the need for such concern. Today, many of these same-sex couples fear
quite the opposite: instead of fearing that the finality of their adoptions could be at
risk, they fear that the finality of these adoptions will prevent them from enjoying
all the advantages of marriage that they now have the right to enjoy. 2 7 5 The issue
in not dissolving these adoptions is that not only did Obergefell make same-sex
marriage legal, but it also madeprohibitingsame-sex marriage illegal.2 76 Refusing
to dissolve these adoptions will weaken the principles behind Obergefell,2 7 7 and in
essence, will facilitate the prohibition of same-sex marriage.
The need for a new and uniform approach to same-sex adoption
dissolution is twofold. First, child adoptions and adult adoptions are often treated
differently statutorily and procedurally. 278 Second, the foundational policy
considerations surrounding child adoption, and its irrevocability, do not apply in
adult adoptions-especially when used by same-sex partners as a legal alternative
to marriage. 27 9 Because of the inherent differences between child adoption and
adult adoption in this context, courts should not treat their dissolutions the same
way.
i.

Statutory and ProceduralVariations

While the process for child adoption may superficially mimic that of adult
adoption, the statutory requirements are substantively different because the
concerns inherent in child adoption are absent in adult proceedings, 2 80 and this
reality should factor into the dissolution analysis. First, in a child adoption, the
biological parents must consent to the adoption-consent of the child is not
considered. 28 1 But in adult adoptions, the adoptee, as an adult, is required to give
his own consent 282 and, obviously, would do so in the case of same-sex partner
adoption. Therefore, that same adult's desire and consent in dissolving the
adoption should be considered a relevant variable at dissolution. In the case of In
re Adoption ofM, the court specifically focused on the age of the petitioner, the

See Potter,supra note 1 (explaining that finality was big question for same-sex couples who
feared losing their adoption status and the legal protections that it carried).
275
See id.
274

276

Id.

277

See supra Section H.A.
See McCabe, supra note 82, at 304-05.
See id.
Id. at 304.
Foy, supra note 97, at 117.
Fowler, supra note 98, at 692.
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age of the adoptee, and how these circumstances were unlike other dissolutions
pertaining to child adoptions.283
Second, state agencies are typically not involved in the adult adoption
process 2 84 because, unlike in a child placement, investigation into the welfare of
the home is unnecessary for an adult. 285 Third, notice to interested parties, which
is normally required in child adoptions, is not normally necessary or relevant for
an adult2 86 who is consenting to the adoption of his own volition and whose natural
parents are no longer legally responsible for his well-being. Furthering the
argument that these variables should be considered at the dissolution stage, the
court in Buchanan focused on the petitioners' consent to the dissolution and
determined that no constitutional rights were being infringed upon because notice
to interested parties was irrelevant in these circumstances. 2 87 Adult adoptions,
unlike child adoptions, have been likened to civil contracts, which removes the
need for inquiry into the parties' relationship and any corollary public policy
2 88
considerations relating to the institution of normalized child adoption.
ii.

DistinctivePolicy Considerations

Not only have legislatures taken different procedural approaches to child
and adult adoption, but the policy considerations for adoption and against
dissolution are not applicable for same-sex partners who were only trying to
work within the discriminating legal constraints imposed upon them preObergefell.289 Irrevocability was a valid concern for legislatures when forming
child adoption statutes. 290 Giving children safe, stable, loving, and permanent
29 1
homes is vital to ensure their success and the future success of our country. It
is no surprise that the best interests of a child would hardly be served by allowing
parents to repeatedly cast a child back into the foster care system simply because
they changed their minds.292 However, even legislatures have realized that in
some circumstances, dissolution of child adoptions would be acceptable, and
maybe even necessary.2 93

283
284
285

In re Adoption of M., 722 A. 2d 615, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
See Fowler, supra note 98, at 693.
See Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,

2016).
287
288

Ratliff, supra note 113, at 1789.
See Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *2.
McCabe, supra note 82, at 306.

289

See id. at 304.
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See supra Section H.C. 1.
See Stewart, supra note 77, at 349.
See Mapes, supra note 143.
See supra Section II.D. 1.
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Conversely, adult adoptions have not been utilized for the purposes that
drive most child adoptions,294 and, as such, the societal considerations behind
this phenomenon differ drastically and should be taken into consideration at the
dissolution stage.295 Same-sex partners mainly used this legal mechanism to
possess a fraction of the legal rights that were automatically bestowed on
heterosexual married couples. 2 96 These adoptions were used so that same-sex
couples could create a bona fide familial relationship, something they were being
discriminatorily denied.297
As seen in Buchanan, the court granted the dissolution and decided that
statutory limitations would not be imposed on same-sex partner adoptions
because the purpose behind the statutes was limited to dealing with minor
children and thus the legislature had not contemplated this specific type of
situation. 29 8 Buchanan concretely demonstrates the public policy considerations
in treating child and adult adoptions differently.299 Interestingly, the court in
Buchanan did actually dive into a best interest determination even though the
petitioner was an adult, much like courts do in the face of child adoption
dissolutions. However, instead of focusing on the factorS 300 that would normally
be considered in a child dissolution case, the court looked to different factors
relating to the unique situation before it. 301 The court focused on the relationship
between the parties and the protections of marriage that had been and would
continue to be denied to the petitioners if the dissolution petition was not
granted.302 The court even went further to explain that the dissolution was in the
best interest of the parties because it would only allow for the strengthening of
their relationship, albeit in a much more dignified manner.3 03 Likewise, the court
in H.M.A. also focused on the desirability of the civil union and how it provided
greater protections for the couple than the adoption could and how, at the time
the adoption took place, it was the only option available.
Alternatively, like the court behind the dissolution decision of In re
Adoption of M., courts could refuse to even approach a best interest
determination since adults are post-emancipation-essentially rendering the best

294
295

296
297
298

299

300
301

Tumipseed, supra note 83, at 100.
McCabe, supra note 82, at 304.
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 79.
Id. at 75.

Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016).
Id. at *4.
See Best Interests, supra note 118.
Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *3.

302

Id.

303

Id.

3

H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618, at *2 (Del. Fan. Ct. Mar. 28,

2013).
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interest standard moot. 3 05 Even though the court in In re Adoption ofM. did not

see the need for a best interest determination as to the petitioner, it still looked to
the parameters of the relationship 3 06 and focused on how the interests of the
parties had changed drastically, considered the truly exceptional circumstances,
and weighed those facts against the public policy principle opposed to the
revocation of adoptions. 307 Regardless of whether a court decides to formally
utilize the best interest standard in the dissolution analysis of same-sex
adoptions, the progressive factors recognized in these successful cases should be
given more weight when balanced with the historical irrevocability principle of
adoptions. Most notably, the courts in these three cases emphasize their inherent
equitable powers to grant relief when justice so requires under the
circumstances.30 s
Unfortunately, for Roland and Nino, the scales of justice were tipped in
favor of finality over equality for over a year.3 09 While the initial denial of the
dissolution petition in the Bosee case may have been reversed,3 10 there will be
other same-sex couples who face these same challenges in the future, and judges
need to be equipped with the tools to efficiently and successfully dissolve these
adoptions in light of Obergefell's mandate that same-sex couples have the
fundamental right to marriage.
B. Paving the Way: A New Uniform Dissolution Framework
While the facts and cases represented in this Note exemplify only a small
fraction of same-sex partner adoptions and dissolutions, they provide guiding
principles on how future courts can approach dissolutions when confronted with
the issue. Courts will better be able to abide by and reinforce Obergefell's
principles of marriage equality if they can apply a flexible uniform dissolution
framework to their same-sex adult adoption cases. This uniform dissolution
framework incorporates four components: (1) statutory direction, (2) equitable
relief, (3) extraordinary circumstances, and (4) best interest determination.
1.

Statutory Direction

Because adoption did not exist at common law and is statutorily
derived, 311 courts should first look to their respective state codes for direction on
See In re Adoption of M., 722 A.2d 615, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
Id. at 618.
307
Id. at 621.
308
Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *1; H.M.A., 2013 WL 1748618, at *2; In re Adoption of
M., 722 A.2d at 620.
309
See In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
310
Id. at *4.
305

306

311

See Fowler, supra note 98, at 689.
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the issue. Almost every state 312 either has specialized adult adoption statutes,313
or general adoption statutes that have language explicitly or implicitly allowing
for adult adoptions. 314 By analyzing the applicable adoption statutes, courts will
be able to determine whether relevant termination procedures have already been
developed by the legislature. If the court finds that a dissolution procedure has
been codified, and allows for dissolution under these unique circumstances, then
the court should follow those respective procedures as defined by its state
legislature. However, if the codified procedures do not explicitly allow for
dissolution of same-sex adult adoptions or if no such procedures currently exist,
then courts should move on to the next component in the uniform dissolution
framework-equitable relief.
As illustrated in Buchanan, the court analyzed its jurisdiction's statutory
provisions in determining whether any relevant provisions existed in controlling
the termination of parental rights.315 In finding that such a statute did exist, the
court ultimately expressed that the provision was not controlling because the
legislature intended that it apply only to cases involving minor children.316
Notwithstanding any limiting statutory provisions, the courts in Buchanan, In re
Adoption ofM., and H.M.A. recognized their inherent authority to grant equitable
relief. 3 17
2.

Equitable Relief

In the event that a court with jurisdiction to hear adoption matters cannot
rectify by relying on its own statutory procedures to effectively dissolve a samesex adult adoption, or in the event that a state code does not provide any directive
procedure whatsoever, a court should then rely on its inherent authority to grant
such equitable relief as it finds is required under the circumstances before it. A
court should use this inherent power to analyze the merits of these cases however
it sees fit. This component would be an appropriate dissolution mechanism, in
the sense that it allows courts wide discretion and flexibility in successfully
dissolving same-sex adoption cases as it sees fit.
To illustrate, the court in Buchanan ultimately concluded that a
restricting code provision was not applicable to adult adoptions, but in erring on

312
313

See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 104, app. at I.
For an example of a statute that specifically allows for the adoption of adults, see COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-1-101 (West 2017).
314

For examples of general adoption statutes, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.010 (West

2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7507-1.1 (West 2017); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-801
(West 2017).
315
Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,2016).
316

Id.
See id. at *1; H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618, at *2 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Mar. 28, 2013); In re Adoption of M., 722 A.2d 615, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
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the side of caution, it countered any potential error in that conclusion by utilizing
to its advantage the best interests standard referenced in the statute pertaining to
child adoptions.3 18 Comparatively, the court in In re Adoption of M. refused to
apply the best interest standard, claiming that it was reserved for minors, and it
instead focused on the "exceptional circumstances" of the case. 31 9 By honing in
on its equitable powers to vacate an adoption decree, a court will have the
flexibility to utilize either the best interests standard or the extraordinary
circumstances standard, depending on the unique circumstances of each case,
any relevant statutory provisions, and the discretion of the respective judges.
3.

Extraordinary Circumstances

If after proceeding through an analysis of the second component of the
uniform dissolution framework, a court decides to rely on the extraordinary
circumstances approach, then it can utilize the examples illustrated in H.M.A.
and In re Adoption ofM. Both of these cases rely on this standard in successfully
dissolving adult adoptions.320 While not being explicitly defined in those cases,
the boundaries of the extraordinary circumstances standard are malleable to the
extent needed to achieve justice and equity.321
The nature of same-sex partner adoption in and of itself is extraordinary.
H.MA. is a case that parallels the issues faced by numerous same-sex couples
who have turned to adoption for limited legal protections.322 In terminating the
adoption, the court recognized the extraordinary circumstances that surrounded
the unconventional adoption, noting that it was no longer equitable for the
adoptive relationship to continue because new laws provided the couple with
better legal protections that were not offered at the time that they decided to use
adoption as a legal means to an end.323 The same will now hold true for samesex couples seeking to dissolve their adoptions so they can exercise their new
legal rights to marriage.
Even though In re Adoption of M does not involve same-sex partner
adoption, the adopted daughter sought dissolution in that case so that she could
eventually marry her adoptive father.324 The court, realizing that the adoption
decree was the only thing standing in the way of the marriage, found that these

318
Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *3.
319
In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 622.
320
See H.MA., 2013 WL 1748618, at *2-3; In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 622.
321
In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 620 (citation omitted) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown
v. Little, 639 A.2d 286, 292 (N.J. 1994).
322
See HMA., 2013 WL 1748618.
323
Id. at *2.
324
In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d at 617.
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exceptional circumstances warranted the equitable relief., 32 5 Same-sex couples
are seeking these dissolutions for the same reasons and, as such, would satisfy
the extraordinary circumstances component.
4. Best Interest Determination
Alternatively, if the court finds that its equitable powers are indeed
restricted by the legislature in terminating these adoptions, it could then actually
utilize those limiting provisions in applying the ordinary best interest
determination-although instead of focusing on factors relating to a child's best
interest, it would focus on factors relating to the unique circumstances found in
same-sex adult adoptions. The best interest standard is the tool most commonly
used by states in adjudicating child adoptions and subsequent dissolutions.326
That being the case, a presiding court can imitate Buchanan in applying the best
interests standard to an adult.327 In re Adoption of M also briefly mentions this
common standard, and even though it did not apply it directly to the adult
petitioner, it focused on the interests of all parties involved in the adoption and
how those interests had drastically changed over time-necessitating the
dissolution.328
In using this standard, a court would be able to apply a flexible and nonexhaustive list of factors in analyzing the best interests of the parties. This list
could include any factors already statutorily defined 32 9 and any additional factors
the court deems relevant to the particular circumstances. 3 3 0 These additional
factors may include, but are not limited to, relevant personal and legal factors
such as the amount of legal protections currently offered to them as compared to
the ones available if dissolution were to be granted; 3 3 1 the quality, nature, and
length of the parties' relationship; 3 32 the parties' own opinions of their best
interest; 13 the extent to which certain relevant societal and legal developments
have altered the parties' interests; 334 and any other factors the court finds
applicable under the circumstances. To illustrate how the uniform dissolution
framework can simplify and expedite the process of future real-world same-sex

325
326
327

Id. at 622.
Stewart, supra note 77, at 359; see also Mertus, supra note 81, at 182.
See generallyBuchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111,2016 WL 2755848 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,

2016).

332

See In re Adoption ofM., 722 A.2d at 621-22.
Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848, at *3.
For an example of a court's application of additional non-statutory factors, see id.
Id.
Id. at *3-4.
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adoption dissolution cases, the framework will be applied to the Bosee facts as
an alternative33 5 analytical case study.
C. The Uniform Dissolution Framework in Application: Bosee
Roland and Nino have been together since 1970 and always dreamed of
being able to get married.336 However, up until 2014, Pennsylvania law
prohibited same-sex marriage.3 37 So, in order to form a legal familial bond and
to obtain other significant legal rights, the couple had to make a tough decision,
one that has been frowned upon throughout society and the legal community
since its inception 13 -in 2012, Nino decided to adopt his adult same-sex partner,
Roland.339 While this may have seemed like the best legal alternative to marriage
at the time, the need for this "pseudo-marriage" 3 40 became null and void in 2015
when the Obergefell ruling declared that same-sex marriage was a fundamental
right in every state across the nation. 34 1 Therefore, Roland and Nino made the
decision to dissolve their adoption so that they could enjoy their newfound right
to marriage.342 Unfortunately, this is where their problems with the dissolution
process began.343 Because of the states' varying laws regarding adoptions and
adoption dissolutions in general, some courts have found it difficult to navigate
the waters of the legal conundrum that has manifested itself in same-sex adult
adoption cases.

34 4

Because Pennsylvania statutory law did not expressly allow for adoption
dissolutions, the Pennsylvania court, which first heard the dissolution petition,
believed that it did not have the authority to grant the petition, and thus denied
it. 3 4 5 Furthermore, the court erroneously believed that granting this petition
would put all adoption decrees in jeopardy regarding their irrevocability. 3 46 The
error in that reasoning is evident by the fact that normalized child adoptions and
33
While the Bosee case has already been successfully resolved, this "alternative" case study
will analyze how the Bosee case could have been handled more efficiently using the uniform
dissolution framework approach when the dissolution was first sought in the Orphans' Court.
336
Potter, supra note 1.
See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
See Anderson-Minshall, supra note 102.
339
Potter, supranote 1.
340
This is a term that has been used to characterize these types of adult adoptions. See Allison,
supra note 107, at 464.
341
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
342
Potter, supra note 1.
343
Id.
337
338

34
345

Id.; see supra Sections II.C, IID.
In re: Adoption of Roland Andrew Bosee, Jr., No. A-12-038 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 21,

2015).
346

Id.
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adult adoptions in the same-sex context are principally different, not only in the
statutory and procedural context, but also in the policy considerations that drive
the two diverse types of adoption.34 7
For some same-sex couples, like Roland and Nino, who are in their elder
years, time is of the essence and a year and a half could make all the difference
in whether these couples will ever be able to exercise their right to marriage. The
couple's arduous one and a half year-long battle with the Pennsylvania court
system could have been avoided if the court could have utilized a uniform
framework to apply to the dissolution process of this unique and specialized type
of adoption. In applying the uniform dissolution framework to the Bosee case, a
court would first start by looking at Pennsylvania law.348 Contrary to the flexible
uniform framework, Judge O'Toole of the Orphans' Court prematurely ended
his analysis at component one-statutory direction. 3 49 Because there is no
Pennsylvania statute that expressly allows for the dissolution of adoptions,35 0 the
new framework would then direct the court to move on to the second component
of the framework-equitable relief. 351
The Orphans' Court, having the jurisdiction to hear adoption matters,3 52
is a court of equity and is authorized to apply the rules and principles of equity
in revoking adoption decrees for good cause, so long as statutory law is not
violated.35 3 Since there is no statute in Pennsylvania codifying any standards to
be used in dissolving an adoption, good cause exists for the court to then be able
to dissolve Roland's adoption under either the extraordinary circumstances of
the case 3 54 or the best interest standard that is routinely used in normalized
adoption-cases. 355
Under component three's extraordinary circumstances approach,3 56 the
court could rely on the examples illustrated in H. MA. 357 and In re Adoption of
M 35 8 This standard is highly flexible because the courts do not explicitly define

347

See supra Section III.A.2.

348

See supra Section III. B. 1.

349

See supra Section II.D.2.iv.

350

351

In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
See supra Section III.B.2.

352

In re Adoption ofR.A.B., 153 A.3d at 335.

Id. at 334-35.
See supra Section III.B.3; see generally H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL
1748618 (Del. Fan. Ct. Mar. 28, 2013); In re Adoption of M., 722 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1998).
355
See supra Section III.B.4; see generally Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111,2016 WL 2755848
(D.C. Super. Ct. 2016); In re Adoption ofM, 722 A.2d 615.
356
See supra Section II.B.3.
3
See supra Section II.D.2.iii.
358
See supra Section II.D.2.ii.
353
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its boundaries except to say that it is malleable to the extent necessary to deliver
3 59
There is no
justice and equity under the unique circumstances of each case.
doubt that the circumstances of the Bosee case and all other same-sex adult
adoption cases are extraordinary. The phenomenon of same-sex adult adoption
has rarely been discussed in the legal community 36 0 -that is until same-sex
marriage became legal. Only then did Roland and Nino's story become highly
profiled.361 Parallel to the facts that were manifested in H.M.A., the extraordinary
circumstances in this case are what make Roland and Nino's adoption no longer
equitable in light of Obergefell and the pursuit of equality.362 Roland and Nino
only used their adoption as a legal means to an end, and that legal means is now
obsolete.3 63 Under these extraordinary circumstances, equity would require that
Roland and Nino's adoption be dissolved so that they can exercise their right to
marry.
Alternatively, if the court decided that it wanted to apply the best interest
standard to Roland's adoption, then the framework would also allow that
discretion under component four. 364 Instead of focusing on the best interest
factors used for normalized child adoptions and dissolutions, the court would
consider a list of non-exhaustive factors that best relate to the unique
circumstances found in same-sex adult adoption. The court in Buchanan used
this standard to dissolve the adoption in that case, and its analysis could be used
as guidance here. 365 It is in Roland's best interest for the adoption to be dissolved
because he is afforded fewer legal protections as an adoptee, than he would be if
he were legally able to marry Nino. Because of their unique and restricted
relationship, they lack the legal, financial, and personal advantages that are
inherent in marriage.3 66
Roland's best interest is also served by the dissolution due to the nature,
quality, and length of his relationship with Nino.367 Roland and Nino have been

359

In re Adoption ofM., 722 A.2d at 620 (citation omitted) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown

v. Little, 639 A.2d 286, 292 (N.J. 1994).
360

Green, supra note 56.

See generally Potter, supra note 1.
See H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar.
28, 2013).
363
Id.
See supra Section III.B.4. This component could also be utilized if the state did in fact have
36
a restricting statutory code provision that required a best interest determination. In that event, the
extraordinary circumstances approach under component three could be bypassed. In regards to the
Bosee case, no such restricting provision exists; therefore, the facts of this case are analyzed under
both the best interest and extraordinary circumstances components, setting forth a complete
illustration of the uniform framework.
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together for over 40 years, and their relationship has always been romantic. 361
By granting the dissolution and allowing them to marry, their relationship as a
couple can only be strengthened, and they will finally be able to possess the legal
status that accurately depicts their personal relationship. 3 69 Most importantly,
however, as an adult, Roland is capable of assessing his own best interests,37 0
and it is his desire to dissolve the adoption so that he can legally marry the love
of his life. 37 1 In utilizing the flexible four-component framework, every court
would have the mechanism necessary to efficiently dissolve these same-sex adult
adoptions. By dissolving these adoptions so that same-sex couples can exercise
their rights to marry, courts will be further promoting Obergefell and its
principles of equality.
D. Let the Rainbow FlagFly: Obergefell's Guiding Principles

The suggestive uniform dissolution framework outlined and analyzed
above will allow courts the flexibility and discretion needed to dissolve adoptions
that probably would have never taken place had it not been for the history of
discrimination against same-sex couples and their fundamental rights. By
employing this framework and dissolving these adoptions, Obergefell's guiding
principles will be reinforced and will be able to live on in the fight for equality.
Obergefell reinforced the right to personal choice regarding marriage, 3 72
and while the couples who chose same-sex adoption did not have this right at the
time they made their decisions, they have it now. Without being able to
successfully dissolve their adoptions, these couples are still-for all intents and
purposes-without the right to make one of the most intimate decisions a person
can make.3 73 Adoption has not been able to parallel the importance of marriage37 4
to those same-sex couples who desire it, and those who cannot dissolve their
adoptions are stuck living in the past. Their fundamental right to marriage and to
intimate association with the person they love goes beyond simply being free
from criminal prosecution,37 5 but without effective dissolution procedures, these
couples do not even have that freedom in light of states' incest statutes.3 76
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For same-sex couples, the right to marry also safeguards their rights in
childbearing and procreation.37 7 Being forced to remain in their adoptions in light
of changing legal and societal developments alters the nature of their rights to
create a larger family unit: This legal conundrum promotes instability,
unpredictability, and stigma in forming families-an issue that Obergefellsought
to remedy. 37 8 Lastly, marriage has historically been considered a keystone of our
nation's legal and social order.3 79 The implication of restricting the dissolution
of these adoptions in favor of finality is two-fold. First, it restricts same-sex
couples' access to a multitude of legal benefits that have historically been linked
to marriage between heterosexual couples.3 80 Second, they are denied the social
prestige and recognition that is central to the institution of marriage in our
society. 38 1 In a society that continues to progress in the march towards same-sex
equality, the denial of these dissolutions is a step in the wrong direction, and
what is worse is that these adoptions are neither the beginning nor the end of the
LGBTQ issues that have arisen in the Obergefell aftermath.
E.

Where Is the Pot of Gold at the End of This Rainbow?

The unforeseen impact on same-sex adoption cases and the subsequent
erosion of adoption decrees may have been one issue arising under Obergefell's
fallout, but it was not the only one.3 82 The concern about the finality of adoption
decrees could possibly be squared away with a solid argument that child and
adult adoptions should be handled differently,3 83 but other currently unresolved
issues stemming from the post-marriage backlash might not be remedied so
easily. Not only is enjoying the right to marry still a challenge for some same384
sex couples, but subsequent divorce could also be impeded by state laws.
38 5
Divorce laws are showing to be implicitly biased against same-sex couples.
The estate of a married couple begins on the date of the marriage-but for the
same-sex couples who were only legally allowed to get married last year, this
puts them at an unfair disadvantage, especially if they have been building a life
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together for decades. 38 The question then becomes whether marriage benefits be
applied retroactively.38
In light of Obergefell, post-marriage backlash has mainly been rearing
its ugly head at a state level, where over 200 anti-LGBTQ bills have been
introduced in 2016 alone. 88 Many of these ill-intended bills stem from
countervailing religious liberty and freedoms laws. 3 89 For example, there have
been numerous lawsuits filed against individual businesses and their owners who
refuse to participate in same-sex nuptials. 3 90 These cases have prominently
involved "a Colorado 'cake artist,' Washington state florist and wedding venues
in Illinois and New York." 3 9 1 However, the backlash does not stop thereironically, it has even been extended to same-sex couples' rights to form a family
and to adopt children.392 Recently, Michigan passed a law that allowed adoption
agencies to refuse services to prospective same-sex parents if doing so would
violate the organization's religious beliefs.39 3
Another bigger, unresolved issue comes into play with the marital
parentage presumption,394 which "serves as the foundation for a lifetime of
parenting rights and responsibilities."3 95 While some states, such as California
and Massachusetts, are willing to apply the presumption, other states, including
Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, and Wisconsin, have not been so gratuitous.39 6 A
corollary issue stemming from increasing LGBTQ rights presented itself to those
who identify as transgender when North Carolina passed a law397 in 2016 making
"it illegal for transgender people to use public restrooms that match their gender
identity."" While this Note focuses on the dissolution of same-sex adoptions, it
recognizes that there are other unresolved issues that need to be remedied when
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it comes to LGBTQ equality. Those remedies are outside of the scope and space
available for this Note, but they, too, should not be ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION

Obergefell has highlighted many examples of same-sex inequality that
remain in our society, including the unresolved dissolutions of past same-sex
adult adoptions due to the disparity of dissolution mechanisms available among
the different states. In order to further extend equality under Obergefell, a
uniform dissolution framework should be applied to these special adoptions so
that the adoption laws of the states can remain stable and so that all couples can
exercise their fundamental right to marriage.
By recognizing that adult adoptions are inherently different from child
adoptions, courts can overcome the presumed irrevocability of these
unconventional adoptions by applying this flexible framework that is guided by
precedential dissolution successes. Courts will now have a greater opportunity to
reinforce the guiding principles that led to Obergefell's landmark decision in
same-sex marriage equality. The additional unresolved issues discussed in this
Note are not the only challenges that have arisen in the fallout months since
Obergefell, and they certainly will not be the last. History has been apt to show
us that equality takes time, effort, and persistence. Without continual evolvement
and adaptation, the history of disgust and discrimination will continue to live on.
Albeit with a victory under his belt, Jim Obergefell could not have been more
399
right when he said, "We will have to continue the fight."
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